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ABSTRACT 
CEO Compensation and Loan Contracting 
By 
MA Yiu Chung 
Master of Philosophy 
 
The agency theory literature implies the pay-performance based managerial 
compensation can relieve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. As 
the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned, managers have incentive to 
invest in best projects and hence to improve firms’ performance. While the use of 
equity compensation to managers may reduce the agency cost between managers and 
shareholders, its impact on agency cost of debts is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large 
portion of equity compensation discourages risk-averse managers to invest in risky 
investment and hence reduce the credit risk. On the other hand, while the equity 
compensation brings the interests of managers in alignment to shareholder it may 
encourage managers to take opportunistic corporate strategies and to exploit the 
wealth of creditors. As a result, creditors may response to the CEO compensation 
package by imposing different covenant restrictions according to their perception of the 
credit risk.  
Supported with empirical evidence, this research finds that loan agreement contains 
more restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of option 
compensation to the total compensation, but contains less restrictive covenants if the 
firm’s CEO has a higher portion of stock compensation to the total compensation.  It 
implies that creditors view that the increase in the use of option compensation would 
increase the credit risk of the firm, while the increase in the use of stock compensation 
would decrease the credit risk. This research also investigates the relation between the 
CEO option compensation and some specific financial covenants. The finding shows that 
the use of liquidity covenant and minimum net worth covenant is positively related to 
the CEO option compensation. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The structure of CEO compensation has changed dramatically in the recent decades. The 
median level of CEO compensation in the 50 largest US firms has been increase from 
$1.8 million in 1980s to $9.2 million in 2000s, increased by more than 300% in 3 decades 
(Frydman and Jenter, 2010). There are four main components in the CEO compensation: 
salary, bonus, stocks, and options. The components of CEO compensation are no longer 
dominated by salary and bonus but by equity compensation nowadays. In the 1980s 
salary and bonus takes up 74% of the total compensation while options and stock takes 
up 19% and 7% respectively. In 2000s salary and bonus takes up only 40% of the total 
compensation, while the option and stock take up 36% and 23% representatively.  
The dramatic changes could be explained by the tax policies which lower the cost of 
option compensation (Hall and Murphy 2003). Another reason is that equity 
compensation is considered to be one of the most efficient performance-based pay 
methods. The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) suggests that the interest of 
shareholder and manager are not the same. The goal of shareholder is to maximize the 
firm’s value, while the goal of manager is to maximize his payoff. If the firm’s 
performance is not related to the manager’s paid, it is hard to expect the manager 
would do their job well.  Equity compensation is one of the performance-based 
compensation that aims at reducing the agency cost of equity. By linking the CEO payout 
with firms’ share price, CEOs have high incentive to improve firm performance and 
hence the good performance can be reflected from the increasing share price. Equity 
compensation is more popular nowadays among other performance-based (like bonus 
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and profit sharing) as share price is believed to be an unbiased indicator to reflect the 
firm value in long run (Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011). Several researches suggest that the use 
of equity compensation has associated with better firm’s performance. Mehran (1995) 
finds that firm’s performance is positively related to the use of equity compensation. 
While the use of equity compensation can reduce the agency cost between managers 
and shareholders, the impact to agency cost of debts is ambiguous. As the payoffs of 
managers are now related to the share price, it affects their risk taking behavior. Stulz 
(1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that managers are generally risk averse. A 
large portion of equity compensation exposes the managers into a high level of firm 
specific risk. As managers receive most of their pay in the form of restricted stock and 
option, they cannot diversify the firm specific risk like the shareholder (investors). To 
reduce such risk, they tend to reduce investment in risky projects (even if they have 
positive NPV) and adapt less risky corporate strategies and hence reduce the credit risk 
of firm. On the other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Brander and Poitevin (1992) 
argue that equity compensation align the interest between shareholders and managers, 
the nature of manager become closer to shareholder, and the manager undergo 
opportunism and take more risky corporate strategies. Creditor would view this as an 
increase in credit risk and hence increase the agency cost of debts.  
I argue that studying the equity compensation alone cannot understand the puzzle, 
instead we should study the whole compensation package in a deeper sense as equity 
compensation contains two very different elements inside: the stock compensation and 
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the option compensation. Although their values are closely related to the stock price, 
the loss of option is limited when the stock price drops below the option exercise price. 
This distinctive nature provides very different incentive to CEO.  
I employ three measurements of CEO equity compensation: The equity incentive ratio, 
the ratio of annual equity compensation to total compensation, and the equity holdings 
to proxy for the incentive from equity compensation. I use the number of covenants as a 
proxy to measure the credit risk. Supported by empirical evidence, I show that loan 
agreement contains more restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher option 
incentive, a larger portion of option compensation to the total compensation, and more 
option holdings. This implies that creditors view the increase in option compensation 
would increase the credit risk of the firm.  
Previous studies suggest that option compensation induce certain CEO manipulation, 
which increases firm’s credit risk. Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007) find that only 
the CEO option compensation but not the stock compensation induces manager to 
misstate financial statement. Kim, Li and Zhang (2011) find that only the CEO option 
incentive is positively related to future stock price crash but not the stock compensation.  
My finding is consistent with these findings, which suggests that only CEO option 
compensation increases firms’ credit risk. 
My another finding shows that loan agreement contains less restrictive covenants if the 
firm’s CEO has a larger portion of stock compensation to the total compensation and 
more stock holdings. It means the creditors view the increase in stock compensation to 
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total compensation would decrease the firm’s credit risk. This finding is consistent with 
the previous studies by Smith and Stulz (1985) that risk averse managers receiving large 
stock compensation tend to reduce the variance of the firm’s return and hence reduce 
the credit risk.  
This research contributes to the literature by investigating the compensation structure 
and the debt contract. Previous researches on CEO compensation structure mainly focus 
on the impacts to firms’ performance and management, while this study investigates 
the relation between CEO compensation and private debt contract. By looking at the 
number of covenants imposed by banks, this research investigates how the equity 
compensation affects creditors’ evaluation on the loan risk. It implies that the CEO 
compensation structure not only affects the firm’s internal control but also the external 
one.   
Another contribution of my research is most of the previous research on loan 
contracting studies the public debt, while this research studies the private debt. There 
are a number of reasons supporting the importance of studying private debt agreement. 
Firstly there are around 80% of public firms maintain private debt agreement while only 
15% – 20% firms have private public debts (Sufi, 2009).  The other reason is due to the 
credit quality.  Denis and Mihov (2003) suggest that the firms with highest credit quality 
tend to use public debt while firms with medium quality tend to use private debts. As 
most of the previous research on loan contract focus on public debts, their works tend 
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to focus on firms’ with highest credit quality. My research on private debt attempts to 
fill the gap that to study the firms with medium credit quality.  
The remaining structure of the thesis is as follow: Chapter 2 provides the literature 
review. Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the data and variables. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical result. Chapter 6 gives the conclusion and future works 
on this topic. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter provides the literature review on the topics of principal agency problem, 
managerial compensation and agency cost of debts. Supported by the literature, I will 
analyze how the equity compensation and loan agreement are connected in the later 
part of this chapter. 
 
2.1 Principal Agency Problem 
Principal agency problem is a widely studied topic in financial economics literature as it 
affects different aspects in corporate governance like capital structure, earning 
management, merger and acquisition decision. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the 
agency relationship as a contractual relationship between two parties, the principal and 
the agent. The principal grants the agent authority to perform service/duties on behalf 
of the principal. As both parties are utility maximizes, it is unlikely that the agent would 
always act in the best interest to the principal if their interests are not allied. The cost 
incurred is defined as agency cost. The occurrence of agency cost is mainly due to the 
divergence of interests between the two parties. The principal can lower the agency 
cost by implanting appropriate incentive mechanism and hence align their interest and 
motivate the agent to act in the best of the principal.  
One of the typical agency relationships in corporate finance is the shareholder (Principal) 
and the manager (Agent). The shareholder employs the manager to manage the firm. 
7 
 
While the interest of the shareholder is to maximize the firms’ value (and hence their 
wealth), the manager’s goal is to maximize his own utility (compensation, reputation 
and managerial power). Without proper incentive the managers might not act in best of 
the shareholders. For example, the managers may over-extend themselves in 
acquisition for empire-buildings, or they don’t have incentive to search for profitable 
projects as they cannot share any gains from these investment. The potential loss from 
over or under investment is costly to the shareholders.  
2.2 Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance 
Previous research and founding suggests that equity-based compensation can reduce 
the agency cost between the shareholder and the manager.  By using equity 
compensation, the interest between shareholders and managers are aligned as part of 
the firm’s equity are now belonging to the manager, which means the payoff to the 
manager depends on the firm’s value. To maximize his/her payoff, manger now has 
strong incentive to search and invest in projects with positive NPV so that the firm’s 
value can be increased and hence his equity portion. 
Previous empirical researches on CEO compensation mainly focus on the impacts to 
firms’ performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) focus on the relation between CEO 
compensation structure and Stockholders’ wealth. Base on the framework of agency 
conflict between shareholders (Principal) and CEO (Agent), they suggest that proper 
compensation policy is needed to align their interest so the CEO has incentive to 
improve firm’s performance. By using a sample of 10,400 CEO-years of data from 1974 
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to 1986, they investigate the pay-performance sensitivity (which is defined as the dollar 
change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a dollar change in the shareholders’ wealth) 
of different performance based compensation such as bonus, salary revision and stock 
option. Although their findings show that equity-based compensation gives the largest 
pay-performance sensitivity which coincides with the literature, the overall sensitivity is 
very low (on average CEO wealth changes by $3.25 for every $1000 change in 
shareholder’s wealth). They suggest the risk averseness of CEO, non-pecuniary rewards 
to CEO and unobservable measures of performance are possible reasons attribute to 
low pay-performance sensitivity. Mehran (1995) focus on both the impact of both 
executive compensation structure and ownership structure to firm performance. He 
suggests that it is the structure rather than the level of compensation motivates CEO to 
improve firm’s performance. By using a sample of 153 manufacturing firms from 1979 to 
1980, he investigates the relations between CEO compensation, CEO ownership and 
firm performance. His result shows that firm’s performance (using Tobin’s Q and Return 
on asset as proxies) is positively related to the percentage of CEO’s equity-based 
compensation and ownership. His findings support the Agency theory that equity 
compensation is associated with better firm performance.  
2.3 Equity compensation and manipulation  
Although the above studies provide strong empirical evidence to show that the use of 
equity compensation has positive impacts to firm performance, there are also findings 
suggest that equity compensation induce managers to engage in certain fraud and risky 
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behavior, includes earning management, hiding firms’ bad news, manipulate firms’ 
financial reports, etc. One of the examples is Enron Scandal. Enron Corporation was one 
of the largest energy companies worldwide with a market capitalization of $60 billion in 
2000. During 1990s, the company enjoyed rapid growth and its stock price has increased 
by more than 300% within 10 years. However it was discovered later that the executives 
have manipulated the financial reports through the accounting loopholes, hiding billions 
of debts and overstated the ever-growing revenue, eventually caused this huge 
corporation to go bankruptcy. The loss to the shareholders and the society is 
extraordinary huge. It was suggested the design of executive compensation caused such 
consequence. By using excessive amount of equity compensation, the executives were 
highly incentivized. To maximize their payoff, they tried to support the high stock price 
by any means (includes over-exaggerating the revenue growth, invest in risky projects, 
hiding the bad news which would hinder the stock price). These value-destroying actions 
harmed the firm value in long run and eventually lead to the firm became insolvent. The 
Enron Scandal caught the attentions of researchers to investigate the implications of the 
use of equity compensation and the results are not one-sided.  
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) investigate the relationship between CEO incentive 
and firms’ earning management. They construct the variable CEO_Incentive as a proxy 
to measure the power of equity-based incentive by calculating the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to the firm’s share price (change of CEO compensation from 1% change in stock 
price). The higher the CEO_Incentive implies the more powerful the equity-based 
compensation is, hence provide more incentive for CEO to take action improve firms’ 
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stock return. CEO may take a number of actions to achieve this goal, one way is to 
improve firms’ performance, the other way is to manipulate earnings’ report and boost 
up the stock price in short run.  By using the accruals as a proxy to measure earning 
manipulation, their finding shows that CEO incentive induces CEO to manipulate firms’ 
earning report, which implies high CEO incentive may harm both shareholders and 
creditors as manipulated report adversely affect firms’ value, and even causing 
bankruptcy. Jiang, Petroni and Wang (2010) extend the work and compare whether it is 
CEO’s or CFO’s incentive is more influential towards earning management.  
Benmelech, Kandel and Veronesi (2010) suggest that due to information asymmetry, the 
use of stock-based compensation not only induce their effort to improve firm’s 
performance, but also motivate them to hide the firms’ bad news about future growth 
options. On the other hand, Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker (2010) finding shows that 
the occurrence of accounting irregularities and CEO equity incentive are negatively 
related. The rationale behind is the equity incentive align the interest of managers and 
shareholder and motivate managers to avoid taking value-destroying actions.    
2.4 Option Compensation 
In the recent decades option has become increasingly important and takes up a more 
significant portion of CEO compensation. In 1970s option only took up 11% of the total 
CEO compensation while in 2000s it took up 37% of the total CEO compensation in the 
50 largest firms in US (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). The rapid increases trend in option 
compensation catches the attentions of the scholars and more studies have been done 
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to investigate the impact of option compensation. The nature of option compensation is 
like a contract which grants the right to the employees to buy the firm’s stock at a 
certain price (exercise price). These options are usually non-tradable and cannot be 
exercised immediately. The employees lose the option if they leave the firm before 
vesting. Similar to stock compensation, option compensation provide incentive for 
employees to improve firm performance as it links the employees’ wealth to firms’ value. 
Also option compensation is a deferred compensation which may help firms to retain 
their employees and reduce the searching cost. But there are some factors which makes 
option different from stock. The value of option is highly depending on the evaluation 
on firms’ prospect. As different employees have different evaluation, firm using option 
compensation can attract those optimistic, highly motivated and entrepreneurial 
employees.  
There are researches have been done on the “effectiveness” (by means of inducing 
employees’ effort) of option compensation, but the conclusion is controversial in the 
literature. Oyer and Schaefer (2006) suggest that option is inefficient mean to provide 
incentive to employees. As option compensation is highly risky to undiversified 
employees (who are risk-averse), the option would worth much less to the employees 
than to a diversified investor. Also a large portion of the option compensation would 
become the risk-premium to compensate for the addition risk imposed to the 
employees, which makes option less effective to induce employees’ efforts. Hall and 
Murphy (2000) suggest that option compensation can provide strong incentive. As 
option value is more sensitive to the stock price, for the same dollar of stock 
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compensation and option compensation, option compensation can provide more 
incentive to employees.  
Apart from effectiveness, the impact of option to corporate strategies also catches the 
attention of the scholars. Dittmann and Maug (2007) argue that under optimal structure 
of executive pay, option should never be granted, the corresponding incentive should be 
provided through restricted stock granted. The implication behind is option does award 
to invest highly risky projects (even if these projects have negative NPV), which induce 
manager to take too much risk.  By using Tobin’s Q as proxy of firm value, Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2005) find that the value of firm and the CEO stock holding is positively 
related, but negatively related to the CEO option holding. They argue that option 
compensation cannot provide CEO enough incentive to maximize the value of firm. 
Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007) use the ratio of bonus, option grants and 
restricted stock to salary as the proxy of CEO compensation structure. Supported by 
empirical data, their finding shows that the ratio of option grants to salary and firm’s 
misstatement on financial report is positively related. Their result implies that option 
motivate CEO to take inappropriate action supporting the share price.  Kim, Li and Zhang 
(2011) investigate the relation between equity compensation and stock price crash risk. 
By using the incentive ratios (stock incentive and option incentive) as proxy to measure 
equity incentive, their finding suggest that option incentive is positively related to future 
stock price crash risk, but the relation between stock incentive and future stock price 
crash is not significant.  
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2.5 Agency Cost of Debt 
Apart from the agency problem between shareholders and managers mentioned in the 
first part of the literature, there exists another type of agency problem between the 
creditor (Principal) and the shareholder (Agent). As the pay-off of debt is determined by 
the preset interest rate while the pay-off to equity is determined by the value of firm, 
there exists a conflict of interest. For example, firm may invest in risky project to 
increase firm value, which increase the default risk and harm the interest of creditor. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that under a highly leveraged financial structure, 
the risk of investment can be shifted to the creditor. As a result owner has incentive to 
engage in investment with high payoffs even if they have negative NPV. If the 
investment success, the owner captures most of the profit, on the other hand if it fails, 
it is the creditor who bears most of the loss. The shareholders may also transfer the 
wealth from the creditors to shareholders through asset substitution (for example, large 
dividend payout). These opportunistic incentive associated with debts generates the 
agency cost of debts. Stockholder may also adapt a high dividend yield policy which 
liquidate the firm asset and transfer the wealth to shareholder. These actions are 
considered as asset substitution, which transfer the wealth from creditor to shareholder 
and hence harm the interest of creditor.  
This thesis extends the literature by investigating how the use of equity compensation 
affects the agency cost of debts. Previous researches of equity compensation focus on 
the firms’ performance and firm risk, which only concern about the conflict of interest 
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between shareholder and manager, without considering the impacts to the creditors.  
Moreover this research separately investigates of stock compensation and option 
compensation, which attempts to solve the puzzle of how the equity compensation 
would affect manager risk taking behavior. 
 
To conclude, the literature suggests the alienation of interest is the main cause of the 
agency problem between shareholders and managers. Equity compensation is one of 
the ways to reduce the agency cost of equity. By allying the interests between the two 
parties, equity compensation provides incentive for manager to improve firm 
performance. However due to the nature maybe “too strong” which motivate the 
managers to engage in highly risky activities or even in fraud, which destroy firm value 
and harm the interest of both shareholder and creditor in the end. In the next chapter I 
will develop the hypotheses and demonstrate the impacts of equity compensation on 
loan agreement. 
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Chapter 3 Hypothesis 
In the last chapter I reviewed the literature on the agency theory and equity 
compensation, provided the background of how equity compensation and the agency 
cost of debt are related. Based on these foundations I will develop the hypotheses on 
equity compensation and loan covenants.   
 
This thesis investigates whether the equity compensation would affect the creditors’ 
evaluation on firm’s credit risk. As mentioned before the use of equity compensation 
can affect manager’s risk taking behavior, it also affects the agency cost of debt. If the 
manager takes more risky corporate strategies, it increases the default risk of firm, 
which is harmful to the creditors. In order to prevent firm undergoes risky strategies, 
the creditor may impose certain covenants to restrict the firm from engage in certain 
activities so that the default risk could be reduced. This means creditors would impose 
more restrictive covenants in the debt contract if they perceive the firm’s credit risk is 
increased.  
Although stock compensation and option compensation are both considered as equity 
compensation and are aimed to induce CEO effort by tightening the CEO pay off with 
share price, their natures are not the same. Begley and Feltham (1999) suggest that 
option compensation has a distinctive difference. Option value does vary with the stock 
price when the strike price is above the stock price, but once the stock price is below the 
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strike price, further drop in stock price does not affect the option value. This distinctive 
nature of option encourages manager to take some highly risky investment with high 
payoff when it successes, even if it has negative NPV. This is because the manager can 
fully benefit from the gains, but only suffers from its losses. Due to this distinctive 
nature, the impacts of stock compensation and option compensation to the credit risk 
are not the same.  
I hypothesize the creditor hold the views that the use option compensation would 
increase the firm’s credit risk and hence induce the creditor to impose more restrictive 
covenants as option compensation induce CEO risk taking behavior. On the other hand 
the use of stock compensation decreases firm’s credit risk and hence induces the 
creditor to impose less restrictive covenants as CEO cannot diversify their portfolio 
which induce them to take less risk. This thesis uses 3 measurements separately for the 
option compensation and stock compensation. For the option compensation, they are 
“annual option compensation ratio”, “option holdings” and “option incentive”; for stock 
compensation, they are “annual stock compensation ratio”, “stock holdings” and “stock 
incentive”. From these variables I develop the follow hypotheses: 
H1a.Bank views CEO’s annual option compensation would increase the firm’s credit risk: 
CEO option compensation ratio and the number of covenants are positively related 
H1b. Bank views CEO’s accumulated option holding would increase the firm’s credit risk: 
CEO option holding and the number of covenants are positively related 
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H1c. Bank views the CEO option incentive to CEO wealth increases the firm’s credit risk: 
CEO option sensitivity to CEO wealth and the number of covenants are positively related 
H2a. Bank views CEO’s annual stock compensation would decrease the firm’s credit risk: 
CEO stock compensation ratio and the number of covenants are negatively related 
H2b. Bank views CEO’s accumulated stock holding would decrease the firm’s credit risk: 
CEO stock holding and the number of covenants are negatively related  
H2c. Bank views the CEO option incentive to CEO wealth increases the firm’s credit risk: 
CEO stock sensitivity to CEO wealth and the number of covenants are positively related 
I also investigate the relation between the number of loan covenants and the 2 common 
measures of CEO equity incentive in the literature: CEO delta and CEO vega.  CEO delta 
measures the sensitivity of CEO’s equity wealth, including both stock and option 
compensation to the change of stock price.  
CEO delta measure depends on the value of both stock compensation and option 
compensation. As I hypothesize before the impacts of stock compensation and option 
compensation to creditor’s evaluation on firm risk are in opposite direction, I 
hypothesize that CEO delta does not have a clear impact to creditor’s evaluation on the 
firm’s credit risk.  
H3. Bank views the CEO delta has no impacts to the firm’s credit risk: CEO stock delta 
and the number of covenants are not related 
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CEO vega measures the sensitivity of CEO’s option holdings to the stock price volatility. 
The convexity of CEO wealth to stock price encourages CEO to take more risky 
investment. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) finding shows that the higher CEO vega 
induce risky investment policies. Support with the literature, I hypothesize that the 
creditor hold the view that the higher the sensitivity of CEO’s option holdings to the 
stock price volatility induce more firm risk. 
H3. Bank views the CEO vega has a positive impacts to the firm’s credit risk: CEO vega 
and the number of covenants are positively related. 
 
I use the number of financial covenants instead of interest rate as proxy to measure  the 
bank’s evaluation on firm risk. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggest that interest rate has 
two impacts on loan risk: The adverse selection effect and the adverse incentive effect. 
The adverse selection aspect perceives interest rate as a screening device to identify the 
quality of borrowers. For those borrowers who willing to pay are the most risky 
borrower. They are willing to accept a high interest rate simply because their probability 
of repaying is low. The adverse incentive aspect perceives interest rate as an incentive 
mechanism which a higher interest rate tends to induce borrower to take more risk. The 
rationale behind is an increase in interest rate lowers the expected return of project 
with high probability to pay back the debts by larger portion than the project with low 
probability to pay back the debts.  Both effects would increase the risk of debts, as a 
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result the interest rate could not be a good measurement to proxy for the creditors’ 
evaluation on loan risk.  
Covenant is a common tool in debt contract to protect the creditor from being exploited 
by the shareholder. By limiting borrower from engaging certain activities, covenant 
prevents the transfer of wealth from lenders to the shareholder. These limitations based 
on firms’ leverage, profitability, working capital, cash flow, capital expenditure and 
dividend policy. For example, the debt to equity ratio covenant limits the ownership 
structure of the firm; the minimum earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) covenant require the firm to maintain certain profitability. If any 
covenants are violated, the borrower is considered to be “technically default” and the 
creditor has the right to accelerate the loan.   
Summarized by Chava and Roberts (2008), there are two rationales support the use of 
covenants: prevent the value reduction and defining the control right. The first rationale 
is based on the agency theory which suggests manager may have incentive to reduce 
firm value for the sake of self-interest (for example, empire-building). These actions 
benefit the manager at the expenses of creditor and shareholder. Covenants like capital 
expenditure restriction and limitation of new debt insurance are designed to address 
such problem and hence prevent the value reduction induced by manager’s self-interest. 
The second rationale suggests that covenant serves as a state-contingent control 
mechanism. Poor performance may lead to violation of covenant. By the threat of 
calling back the loans, creditor may negotiate for more favor terms (like higher interest 
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rate) or impose other restrictive covenants. Under this situation part of the control right 
is transferred to the creditor from the manager. To prevent such consequence, manager 
has incentive to improve firm’s performance in order to retain the control right (so as to 
protect the associated benefit). This mechanism rewards proper management and 
punish poor management which induce manager’s effort and hence add value to the 
firm. The above characters justify the use of covenant could reduce the credit risk faced 
by creditors, which implies the use of covenant serves as a proper measure of the 
creditors’ evaluation on loan risk.  
 
In this chapter, I build up the hypotheses that option compensation and loan covenants 
are positively related, on the other hand stock compensation and loan covenant are 
negatively related. In the next chapter, I’ll describe the data and variables which I have 
employed to examine the results. 
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Chapter 4 Data and Variables 
In the last chapter I developed the hypotheses on the relation between equity 
compensation and the number of financial covenants contained in loan agreement. In 
this chapter, I will describe the variables and the data sources. 
 
4.1 Data Sources 
The primary data source of the loan’s information is from DealScan, which includes Loan 
size, maturity, loan purpose, etc. For the firm’s information, the data is from CompuStat, 
which includes asset size, profit, liabilities, etc. For the CEO’s compensations, the data is 
from ExeceComp which includes annual compensation, option holdings, stock holdings, 
option exercise price, option maturity, etc. 
For the loan covenants data, the primary source is from Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009). 
They suggest that although DealScan provides information on the debt covenant, there 
is many missing report. In order to obtain a more comprehensive covenant data set, 
they develop another method. They collect the covenant data by using text-searching 
programs to scan through the 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K filling in Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR). EDGAR contains the information that firms are 
required by law to file forms with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Information like loan contract agreement is included in the database. They collect the 
covenant data from 1996 – 2005. They scan all the filing in EDGAR with the following 
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keywords in capital letters “credit agreement”, “loan agreement”, “loan and security 
agreement”, “revolving credit”, “financing and security agreement:, “financing and 
security agreement”, “credit and guarantee agreement:, and “credit and guarantee 
agreement”. If any of these keywords are found, the text-searching program would 
extract the paragraph within 20 lines into the document. I follow their method and 
further extend the data to 2006. I also check all the missing loan information from the 8-
K file. I use the date, borrowers’ CIKA and firms’ name to identify each loan contract and 
match with other loans’ information in DealScan.  
The sample of the loan deals contains the private loan agreements in US with the period 
from 1996 to 2006. All the loan agreements without corresponding firms’ information 
and CEO compensation’s information are excluded from the sample. The final sample 
includes 1512 loan agreements from 791 firms.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the loan agreements in my sample. For the loan 
size, the mean is 567 million and then median is 300 million. For the maturity, the mean 
is 42.7 months and the median is 48 months. For the interest spread, the mean is 116.6 
basis points and the mean is 87.5 basis points. Among the sample, 77.6% of them have 
performance pricing, which means their terms and conditions (like spread rate) could be 
modified depends on firm’s financial performance (like leverage). 35% of the loan 
agreement in the sample are secured and back by collateral. 
For the loan covenants, I follow Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) and classified 7 types of 
financial covenants: Coverage ratio covenant (includes interest coverage, fixed charge 
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coverage and debt service coverage covenants), Debt to cash flow covenant (includes 
debt to cash flow and debt to senior cash flow covenants), Net worth covenant (includes 
minimum net worth and minimum tangible net worth covenants), Debt to balance sheet 
covenants (includes debt to capitalization and debt to net worth covenants), Liquidity 
covenant (includes minimum working capital, current ratio and quick ratio covenants), 
minimum cash flow covenant (includes minimum EBITDA and minimum cash flow 
covenants) and Capital expenditure restriction covenants. On average the loan deal in 
my sample contains 2.22 types of financial covenants and the median is 2. Among the 7 
types of financial covenants, Coverage covenant is the most common type of covenant, 
64% of the sample loan deal contains this type of covenant. The second common type of 
covenants is Coverage ratio covenant, 51.9% of the loan deal in my sample contain this 
type of covenant. The least common type of covenant is Minimum cash flow covenant 
and Liquidity covenant, among the sample only 5.4% and 8.9% of the loan deal contains 
these types of covenant respectively. 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of firm and CEO compensation. The average asset 
size of the firm (borrower) is 4,890 million dollars and the median is 1,600 million dollars.  
For the CEO compensation, the mean of annual total compensation is 4,847,493 dollars 
and the median is 2,563,169 dollars. On average the annual option compensation takes 
up 33% of the annual total compensation; annual stock compensation takes up 8% of 
the annual total compensation.  The median of stock holding and option holding are 
5,634,107 dollars and 2,903,512 dollars respectively.  
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4.2 Dependent Variable 
My research studies the relation between debt contract and CEO compensation. Unlike 
previous studies which most of them focus on public debt agreement, I focus on private 
debt agreement. Denis and Mihov (2003) suggest that credit quality does affect the 
choice of debts. Those firms with highest credit quality tend to use public debts, while 
firms with medium credit quality tend to borrow from bank. Studying public debts alone 
might omit those firms with medium credit quality. My research fills the gap of the 
literature by studying private debt contract so that the behavior of those firms with 
medium credit quality can be investigated. Due to concentrated ownership of the debt, 
banks are allowed to process more information like the accounting information, 
financial information and even management decision of the borrower (Fama, 1985). So 
the terms and conditions included in the private debt agreement can better reflect the 
financial situation of the borrower. Private debt agreement is suggested to be the 
largest source of financing for corporation (Sufi, 2009). These reasons justify the 
importance to study private debt agreement. 
FinCov_Num : The financial covenant index measure the degree of restrictiveness of the 
loan contracts to the firm’s management. Following Bradley and Roberts (2004) 
assumption that the more number of covenants means greater the restrictions to the 
firm, I construct a financial covenant index by counting the number of financial 
covenants included in the private debt contract. Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) defines 7 
types of financial covenants, they are Coverage ratio covenants, Debt to cash flow ratio 
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covenants, Net worth covenants, Debt to balance sheet covenants, liquidity covenants, 
Minimum cash flow covenants and Capital expenditure restriction covenants. I follow 
their definitions and construct a financial covenant index with range of 0 to 7. Although 
there is potential limitation of the covenant index as it implicitly assumes that all types 
of covenant have the same weight in the index, the approach is transparent and it 
accounts the impacts of all types of financial covenants. 
4.3 Independent Variable – equity compensation 
Follow the literature I employ 5 measurements to measure the relative equity incentives. 
These measurements are the sensitivity of CEO’s wealth (include stock and option 
compensation) to the change of stock price (delta), the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the 
stock price volatility (vega), ratio of equity compensation in current year, accumulated 
equity holdings and the CEO incentive. 
 
CEO delta: measures the dollar change in the value of the option or restricted stock 
grants, share holdings, and any restricted stock and option holdings for a 1 % change in 
the stock price. 
CEO vega: measures the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s option grants and any 
option holdings for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. 
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Ratio of equity compensation in current year: For the proxies to measure CEO 
compensation structure, I follow Mehran (1995) and employ 2 measures: 
Option Ratio: the percentage of current year total compensation in grants of new 
options. This variable measures the relative size of option compensation in the current 
year. The option valuation is based on the Black-Scholes formula.  
Stock Ratio:  the percentage of current year total compensation in grants of new stock. 
This variable measures the relative size of stock compensation in the current year. 
Accumulated equity holdings: For the proxies to measure CEO stock holding and option 
holding. I follow Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007) and employ 2 measures: 
Option holding/Cash pay: the ratio of accumulated option holdings to the current year 
salary of CEO. This variable measures the relative size of option holding to the non-
equity compensation.  
Stock holding/Cash pay: the ratio of accumulated stock holdings to the current year 
salary of CEO. This variable measures the relative size of option holding to the non-
equity compensation. 
CEO incentive: For the proxies to measure the strength of CEO incentive from stock and 
option, I follow Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Kim, Li and Zhang (2010) and 
employ 2 measures: 
Option Incentive: ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus),  
(where ONEPCT_OPT = 0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of options hold by CEO) 
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The ONEPCT_OPT is the dollar change in CEO option holdings resulting from 1% change 
in firm’s stock price. Option Incentive is the incentive ratio measure the relative strength 
of incentive from option holdings to CEO.  
Stock Incentive: ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus),  
 (where ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share Price*no. of shares hold by CEO) 
The ONEPCT_STK is the dollar change in CEO stock holdings resulting from 1% change in 
firm’s stock price. Similar to Option Incentive, Stock Incentive is the incentive ratio 
measure the relative strength of incentive from stock holdings to CEO. 
 
4.4 Control Variables – Firm Characteristics 
The evaluation of credit risk and borrowing cost are highly depending on firms’ 
characters, so I have put a number of firm specific control variables in the model.  
Log Asset (The Logarithm of a firm’s total assets): Firm size is important in loan cost 
evaluation as larger firms usually come with better reputation, hence they can negotiate 
with better terms (for example, less restrictive covenants and lower spread) . Larger 
firms also associate with less information asymmetry. (Graham, Li, Qiu (2008)) 
Profitability (The ratio of profit to total assets): Following Graham, Li, Qiu (2008), it is the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total 
asset. This variable controls for the ability of firms to make profit. Firms with higher 
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profitability are expected to have lower default risk as they are less likely to issue 
additional debt. 
Asset Tangibility (The ratio of tangibility assets to total assets):  Follow Graham, Li, Qiu 
(2008), it is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. This variable 
measures the quality of loans’ collateral. As banks have the right to takeover firms’ asset 
(collateral) in the event of default, more tangible assets should lower the borrowing cost 
and hence less restrictive covenant would be imposed. 
Market to Book Ratio (The ratio of market value of asset to the book value of assets): 
Follow Graham, Li, Qiu (2008), I calculate this ratio by dividing the sum of market value 
of equity and book value of debt by total assets. This variable is a proxy to control for 
firms’ growing opportunities. Firms with high growth opportunities mean they are 
expected to have more future cash flows. As a result their borrowing cost is lower. 
However growing firms are also more vulnerable to financial distress, so their credit risk 
could be higher.  
Leverage (The ratio of long term debts to total assets):  This variable measure the 
financial status of firms. Firms with higher leverage are expected to have higher default 
risk, which increase the borrowing cost. 
S&P Ratings: The rating from S&P reflects the firm quality and credit risk. The higher the 
credit rating means the better credit quality, which is expected to associate with lower 
loan spread and less restrictions (covenants) in borrowing. I have created 8 dummies 
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variable (with AAA =1, AA = 2, A=3, BBB=4, BB=5, B=6, CCC=7, CC or below = 8) to 
control for the credit rating. 
Industry Control: Dummy variables have been used to control for unobserved industry 
characteristics. 
4.5 Control Variables – Loan Characteristic 
Apart from controlling the firm’s characteristics, various loan factors are also controlled. 
These control variables include: 
ln(Deal amount): the Natural Logarithm of the loan amount, which control the economy 
of scale in the bank’s lending (Graham, Li and Qiu (2008)). 
ln(maturity): the Natural Logarithm of the loan maturity in months, which controls the 
liquidity premium required by the bank (Graham, Li and Qiu (2008)). 
Performance pricing: a dummy memory equal to 1 if the loan agreement contains 
performance pricing (i.e. the loan spread is tied to firm financial performance) and 
otherwise 0.  
Loan Purpose: Dummy variables have been used to control for different loan purposes. 
Loan Type: Dummy variables have been used to control for different loan types. 
4.6 Other control variables 
Credit Spread: the difference between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate 
bond yield. The higher the difference means a higher risk premium is required. This 
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variable serves as a proxy to control for macroeconomic conditions. (Graham, Li and Qiu 
(2008))  
 
This chapter provides the data sources, describes the summary statistics of the data and 
shows the computation of several key variables of this research. The next chapter will 
present the model and regression results. 
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Chapter 5 Regression analysis 
The last chapter described the computation of the three measurements of CEO 
compensation: equity incentive, annual equity compensation ratio and accumulated 
equity holdings. In this chapter, I will present the regression results and examine the 
effects of CEO equity compensation on the usage of financial covenants in loan 
agreement. 
 
5.1 Main regressions 
Poisson regression is used to examine the relation between CEO equity compensation 
and number of covenants: 
Yi,t = α + β1(CEO Compensation Variables)i,t-1 + β2(Firm Control Variables)i,t-1  
+ β3(Loan Control Variables)i,t + β4(Other Control Variables)i,t-1 + μi,t  
where Y is the number of financial covenant 
Probit regression is used to examine the relation between CEO equity incentive and the 
probability to include coverage covenants and debt to cash flow covenants. 
Pr(Yj,t=1) = F(α +β1(CEO Compensation Variables)j,t-1 +β2(Firm Control Variables) j,t 
+β3(Loan Control Variables) j,t +β4(Other Control Variables)j,t-1))  
where Yjt=1 if covenant j exists and 0 otherwise  
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Table 3 to Table 5 present the result of the relation between CEO equity compensation 
and financial covenants.  Different columns represent the regression results with 
different control variables, which include loan purpose, loan type, industry and S&P 
rating. The coefficients of the key variables Option Ratio, Option holding/Cash pay and 
Option Incentive have changes after controlling for S&P rating in column 4 and column 5, 
which confines with the previous study of Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) that loan 
covenants are sensitive to the S&P ratings. 
Table 3 presents the result of the relation between CEO incentive and the number of 
financial covenants. The dependent variable is the number of financial covenants. The 
more covenants implies a higher credit risk to the perception of bank. The key variables 
here are the Option Incentive and Stock Incentive. The Incentive variables hypothesize 
the impact of 1% increase in stock price to the CEO wealth, which capture the relative 
incentive provided by the stock compensation and option compensation. Follow the 
framework of Chava, Kumar and Warga (2009) and  Graham, Li and Qiu (2008) I also 
include the Loan characteristic variables (loan amount, maturity, loan purpose, loan 
type and performance dummy), Firm characteristic variables (Firm size, profitability, 
tangibility, leverage, market to book ratio) and credit rating) and Macroeconomic 
control variables (credit spread) into the regression.  The result shows that number of 
financial covenant is positively related to Option Incentive. The increases in the number 
of financial covenant range from13.9% to 29.4% if the option incentive increases from 0 
to 1. By adding more control variables the coefficient is reduced, but it remains 
statistically significant. This finding shows that the loan agreement contains more 
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restrictive financial covenants when firm’s CEO payoff is more sensitive to option. As 
mentioned before the loss from option is limited, the high option sensitivity to CEO 
payoff implies that CEO has a higher incentive to support a higher stock price by means 
of taking risky corporate strategy in order to maximize the payoff. These action induced 
by the option incentive would increase the credit risk of firm perceived by bank. To 
protect its interest, the bank imposes more financial covenants to prevent CEO engaging 
in certain risky strategy. On the other hand the relation between Stock Incentive and 
number of financial covenant is insignificant.  The asset size of firm is negatively and 
significantly related to the number of financial covenants, which is consistence with 
Graham, Li, Qiu (2008) suggest that firms with larger size could negotiate with better 
terms, as they usually comes with a better reputation and with less information 
asymmetry. Previous findings (Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Graham, Li, Qiu (2008)) 
suggest that the credit spread reflects the macroeconomic condition. A high credit 
spread means the creditor demands for a higher risk premium, which implies the credit 
risk is higher. My finding shows that credit spread is positively and significantly related 
to number of financial covenants, which is consistence with the literature.  
Apart from the number of financial covenant, I also investigate the relation between 
CEO equity incentive and the probability of the loan agreement containing the 2 most 
common types of covenants – the coverage covenant and the debt to cash flow 
covenant.  
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Table 4 presents the result of the relation between CEO option incentive and the 
probability of the inclusion of coverage covenant. Following Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009), 
the coverage covenant includes the fixed charge coverage, interest coverage and debt 
service coverage covenants. These covenants require the firm to meet a minimum level 
of revenue over the fixed charges, interest expenses and debt service expenses. In 
general, the largest component of fixed charge to the firm is the interest payment to 
debt. The aim of coverage covenant is to ensure the firm has the ability to meet its debt 
obligation. A low revenue or high interest payment would cause the violation of the 
coverage covenant. In order to avoid violation of the covenant, the firm has to increase 
the firm revenue. It can also reduce the interest payment by improving the creditability 
or decreasing the debt level. The coverage covenant is effective to reduce the firm 
credit risk from CEO opportunisms. As the covenant requires firm to have sufficient 
revenue to support the interest payment, it discourages CEO’s empire building behavior 
(i.e. non-profitable acquisition). 
The key variables here are the Option Incentive and Stock Incentive. The Option 
Incentive has a positive and significant effect to the use of coverage ratio covenant. The 
increases in probability range from 27.3% to 40.3% if the option incentive increased 
from 0 to 1. The result shows that when CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to option, the 
high probability for the bank to include coverage covenant into the loan agreement, 
which implies the bank views the option incentive of CEO would increase the credit risk 
of the firm. On the other hand the relation between Stock Incentive and probability of 
the use of coverage covenant is insignificant. 
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Table 5 presents the result of the relation between CEO option incentive and the 
probability of the inclusion of the debt to cash flow covenants. The debt to cash flow 
covenant includes the total debt to cash flow covenant and senior debt to cash flow 
covenants. It requires the firm to have a ratio of total debt to revenue not to exceed 
certain level. The nature of debt to cash flow covenant and coverage covenant are 
similar that they both target on the ability of firm to meet the debt obligation. The use 
of debt to cash flow covenant can reduce the credit risk of firm by restricting the firm’s 
borrowings. It ensures the firm’s borrowing is supported by sufficient revenue. The 
results show that the key variable option incentive has a positive and significant effect 
to the use of debt to cash flow covenant. The increases in probability range from 32% to 
49.1% if the option incentive increased from 0 to 1.  On the other hand, the Stock 
Incentive has a negative and significant effect to the use of debt to cash flow covenant. 
The decreases in probability range from 9.5% to 11.9%. The results suggest that to the 
perception of bank, if the CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to option compensation, the 
credit risk of firm increases. On the other hand the credit risk of firm is lower to bank if 
the CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to stock compensation. These findings are 
consistence with my hypotheses that the use of option compensation increases credit 
risk of firm, while the stock compensation decreases credit risk of firm. 
Table 6 shows the result of the relation between CEO annual compensation and the 
number of financial covenants. The key variables are the Option Ratio (ratio of annual 
option compensation to total compensation) and Stock Ratio (ratio of annual stock 
compensation to total compensation). The ratio of annual option compensation ratio 
36 
 
has a significant and positive effect on the number of covenant. The increases in 
number of covenant range from 7.1% to 9.5% if the option compensation ratio 
increased from 0% to 100%. This finding shows that when CEO’s annual compensation 
contains more option, the bank imposes more financial covenants in the loan 
agreement. It is consistent with my hypothesis that the bank views CEO option 
compensation would increase firm’s credit risk. The results suggest that to the 
perception of bank, if the CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to option compensation, the 
credit risk of firm increases.  
The ratio of annual stock compensation ratio, on the other hand, has a significant and 
negative effect on the number of covenant. The decreases in number of covenant range 
from 25.6% to 27.4% if the stock compensation ratio increased from 0% to 100%. The 
results suggest that the use of stock compensation and the number of financial 
covenants are negatively related, which means bank views CEO equity compensation 
would decrease firm’s credit risk. This finding is consistence with my hypothesis that the 
bank views CEO stock compensation would decrease firm’s credit risk. 
Table 7 shows the result of the relation between CEO equity holdings and the number of 
financial covenants. The key variables here are the Option holding/Cash pay 
(accumulated option holding over cash compensation in current year) and Stock 
holding/Cash pay (the accumulated stock holding over cash compensation in current 
year). The number of financial covenant is positively related to the CEO Option holding, 
but negatively related to CEO stock holding. Although both coefficients are small, they 
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are statistically significant, which provides evidence showing that bank views the CEO 
option holding increases the credit risk of firm and the CEO stock holding decreases the 
credit risk of firm. 
Table 8 shows the result of the relation between CEO delta, CEO vega and the number 
of financial covenants. The key variables here are CEO delta and CEO vega. The result 
shows that CEO delta and the number of financial covenant are negatively related, but 
the relation is not statistically significant. The result is consistence with my hypothesis 
that delta does not have a clear relation with banks’ evaluation on firm’s credit risk. As 
the impacts from stock compensation and option compensation are in opposite 
direction, delta cannot be a good variable to measure how banks evaluate the firms’ 
credit risk associate with CEO compensation.  On the other hand for CEO vega, the result 
shows that it has a significant and positive impact to the number of financial covenants. 
It provides evidence showing that bank views the higher CEO vega increases the credit 
risk of firm and the CEO stock holding decreases the credit risk of firm. It is consistence 
with the literature and my hypothesis that a high CEO vega induce risky investment 
policies, which increases the firms’ credit risk.  
To conclude, the empirical evidence shows that the use of covenants is positively 
related to the option compensation in terms of all measurements: the annual option 
compensation ratio, the accumulated option holdings and the option incentive. The 
results suggest that the bank views the use of CEO option compensation increases the 
firm’s credit risk. On the other hand I also find that the use of covenants is negatively 
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related to the annual stock compensation ratio and accumulated stock holdings, which 
provide evidence to show that bank view the use of CEO stock compensation decreases 
the firm’s credit risk. 
5.2 Subsample analysis: Credit Spread 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Graham, Li and Qiu (2008) suggest credit spread is a 
good proxy to measure the macroeconomics conditions. The credit spread measures the 
differences between the AAA corporate yield and BAA corporate bond yield. The 
differences could be explained by, among other things, the firm-specific risk, business 
climate, interest rate, market volatility.. These factors reflect the situation of macro-
economy. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) argue that the credit spread is 
lower during expansion and higher during recession. It is because the investors would 
demand for a higher risk premium during economic downturn to compensate for the 
increased default risk. Chen (2010) suggests that the expected growth rate of firm is 
lower during recession. Also the expected cash flow of firm is lower and more volatile.   
Moreover the uncertainty of economic prospect during recession raises investors’ 
marginal utilities and hence they would demand for a higher risk premium on securities. 
These factors as a result increase the credit risk of firm during recession period. 
Bushman, Dai and Wang (2010) argue if the systematic risk (especially during recession) 
is high, it is harder for the board to truly interpret the CEO talent in relation to firm 
performance as the volatility of firm performance is driven by factors beyond CEO 
controls. Base on the above studies, I hypothesize that the impact from option incentive 
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is higher at the period with high credit spread. As the high credit spread increases the 
firm performance volatility and hence CEO can hide their inappropriate behavior easier.  
Table 8 shows the subsample analysis on credit risk. The whole sample is divided into 2 
groups: the group with the credit spread higher or equal to the median and the group 
with the credit spread lower than the median. The key variables here are Option 
Incentive, Option ratio and Option holdings/cash. The results show that CEO incentive 
and Option ratio are significantly and positively related to the number of financial 
covenants only in the high credit spread group. While for option holdings/cash, it is 
significant and positively related to the number of covenants for both groups. The above 
regressions results are consistent with the previous studies which suggest that debt 
holder view the increase in credit spread increases the firm’s credit risk. 
5.3 Subsample analysis: leverage  
Previous literature suggests the use of debt can alleviate the managerial agency 
problem by reducing the free cash flow controlled by managers. Grossman and Hart 
(1982) suggest the use of short-term “hard” debt (refer to senior debt and non-
postponable debt) reduces the free cash flow by forcing the managers to repay the 
debts promptly. Hart and Moore (1995) argue the use of long-term debt can impose 
certain constraints to manager’s future investments. As firm with high debt level (or 
highly leveraged) would be more difficult to further raise capital. Supported with 
empirical data, Chava, Kumar and Warga (2009) find that holding the default risk 
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constant, the managerial agency cost from managerial entrenchment is lowered for 
highly leverage firm.  
From the above work, I hypothesize that holding default risk constant, the impact from 
option incentive to credit risk would be lower for the highly leveraged firm. The high 
level of debt decrease the free cash flow controlled by CEO, also the threat of bankrupt 
has a discipline effect to hinder CEO from taking risky corporate strategy.   
Table 10 shows the subsample analysis on firm’s leverage. Similar to the subsample 
analysis on credit spread, I divide the whole sample into 2 groups: the group with the 
firm leverage higher than or equal to the median and the group with the firm leverage 
lower than the median. The key variables here are still Option incentive, Option ratio 
and Option holdings/cash. The results show that CEO incentive and Option ratio are 
significantly and positively related to the number of financial covenants only in the low 
leverage group. While for option holdings/cash, it is significant and positively related to 
the number of covenants for both groups. The results are consistent with the literature 
that debt has a discipline role to reduce managerial agency risk. 
5.4 Subsample analysis: Market-to-Book-Ratio  
Previous studies suggest the firms’ growth opportunities have certain implications on 
firm’s risk. As there is conflict of interest between creditor and shareholder, firms with 
more growth opportunities are more likely to have risk-shifting behavior (Eisdorfer, 
2008). It implies that CEO has a higher tendency to invest in riskier project. I use market-
to-book ratio as proxy of growth opportunity and hypothesize that the impact from 
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option incentive to credit risk would be higher for the firm with more growth 
opportunities.  
Table 11 shows the subsample analysis on firm’s market-to-book-ratio. The sample is 
divided into two groups: the group with the firm’s market-to-book-ratio higher than or 
equal to the median and the group with the firm’s market-to-book-ratio lower than the 
median. The key variables are Option incentive, Option ratio and Option holdings/cash. 
The results show that both Option Incentive, Option ratio and Option holdings/cash are 
significantly and positively related to the number of financial covenants only in the high 
market-to-book-ratio group. The above results are consistent with the previous studies 
that growth opportunities induce more firms’ credit risk and affect banks’ evaluation on 
firm risk. 
5.5 Robustness Test: Instrumental Variables 
To encounter the potential endogeneity problem which the expectations on the future 
loan contract may affect the current CEO compensation package, I employ the certain 
Instrumental Variables: 
Instrumental Variables for Option Incentive ratio: Average option holding of other firms 
in the same industry  
Instrumental Variables for Stock Incentive ratio: Average stock holding of other firms in 
the same industry  
Instrumental Variables for Option ratio: Average Option  ratio of other firms in the same 
industry  
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Instrumental Variables for Stock ratio: Average stock ratio of other firms in the same 
industry  
Instrumental Variables for Option Holding / Cash Pay: Average Option Holding / Cash 
Pay of other firms in the same industry  
Instrumental Variables for Stock Holding / Cash Pay: Average Stock Holding / Cash Pay 
of other firms in the same industry  
Table 12 presents the OLS regression result with the instrumental variables. It shows that 
all the option incentive variables (the Option Incentive ratio, Option ratio and Option 
Holding / Cash Pay) remain significantly and positively related to the number of financial 
covenants. However for the stock incentive variables, only the Stock Holding / Cash Pay 
remains significantly and positively related to the number of financial covenants. The 
result provides strong evidence that CEO option incentive would increase the banks’ 
evaluation on firms’ credit risk. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This thesis examines the relation between CEO equity compensation and loan covenants. 
By using a novel set of loan characteristics, I find that both the CEO option incentive, 
annual option granted ratio and the accumulated option holding are positively and 
significantly related to the number of financial covenants included in the loan 
agreement. The finding suggests that the creditor views the use of equity compensation 
increase the credit risk of a firm, and the use of financial covenants reflected the level of 
credit risk. The findings consistent with the literature that the use of option 
compensation induce risk taking behavior (Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007), Kim, 
Li and Zhang (2011)), On the other hand, I also find that the CEO annual stock granted 
ratio and the accumulated stock holding are negatively and significantly related to the 
number of financial covenants included in the loan agreement, which suggested that 
creditor views the use of stock compensation alleviate the credit risk of firm. This finding 
is consistent with Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker (2010) which suggest that CEO with 
large shareholding is discouraged to take value destroying action. 
This thesis also investigates how the credit spread and leverage affect the credit risk 
evaluation by creditor. By using the subsample analysis and divide the whole sample 
into two groups with high credit spread and low credit spread, I find that the CEO option 
incentive and annual option granted ratio are both positively and significantly related to 
the number of financial covenants only in the group with high credit spread. This finding 
is consistent with previous studies (Chen (2010)), which argue that under high 
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systematic risk, it is harder to notice the information content of CEO performance, so 
CEO has more incentive to engage in risky corporate strategy and hence increase credit 
risk of firm. Similar subsample analysis has also been use to investigate the impact from 
leverage. The finding shows that CEO option incentive and annual option granted ratio 
are both positively and significantly related to the number of financial covenants only in 
the group with low leverage. This finding is consistent with Chava, Kumar and Warga 
(2009), which suggest a highly leveraged firm structure would alleviate the managerial 
agency cost.  
Previous empirical studies on CEO compensation focus on it impacts to firm 
performance and corporate strategy but fail to address how the CEO compensation 
structure affects the firms’ debt finance. By linking the CEO compensation structure and 
the financial covenants included in the loan agreement, it shows that creditor perceive 
option compensation would increase the credit risk and stock compensation would 
decrease the credit risk. By separately investigate the two components: option 
compensation and stock compensation, this thesis shed some light to the puzzle of 
whether equity compensation would have a positive or negative impact to the agency 
cost of debt. The use of option induce CEO risk taking behavior due to its nature that the 
loss is “limited” and hence it increases credit risk; the use of stock compensation tight 
CEO’s wealth with share price. As CEOs are risk averse, they would take less risky 
corporate strategy if they have large share holdings, which decrease the credit risk. 
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My finding suggests the creditor would react accordingly to the CEO compensation 
structure, which implies that the CEO compensation does not only affect the internal 
control, but also the external control. The literatures on CEO compensation focus on 
how it would affect internal control. For example, Weisbach (2007) summarizes the 
optimal CEO compensation contract depends on how well it can align manager and 
shareholder interest and hence improve firm performance. Oyer and Schaefer (2006) 
focus on the cost of compensation, and suggest that the use of option is an expensive 
way to compensate CEO as it worth much less to risk-averse CEO. Hall and Murphy 
(2000) argue that option is cheap. As for the same dollar of compensation, option can 
provide the most incentive to CEO than other types of compensation. Dittnann and 
Maug (2007) argue that the optimal compensation should not include options, but only 
low fixed salary and high portion of stock compensation. The rationale behind is option 
compensation induce excessive risk-taking behavior. The incentive to improve firm 
performance should be alternatively provided by stock compensation. The above 
studies ignore the fact that CEO compensation structure would also affect the outside 
parties’ perception to the firm. My research examines the relation between 
compensation and loan contract, and suggests that CEO compensation structure would 
affect the cost of finance. These factors should also be included in determining the 
optimal structure of CEO pay.  
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Appendix  
The calculation of option delta is based on the Black-Scholes option-pricing model: 
Z = 
  [ 
 
 
 ]   [      
  
 
 ]
 √ 
 
Delta =          
N = Cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = Fiscal year end share price (prccf from Compustat) 
X = Exercise price of the option (expric from Compustat for new granted option)  
  = expected stock return volatility over the life of option (bs_volatility from Compustat) 
d = the expected dividend yield over the life of option (bs_yield from Compustat) 
r = the risk free rate (from US Department of Treasury) 
T = remaining time to maturity of the option (exdate from Compustat for new granted 
option) 
 
In order to calculate the delta of the option portfolio, it is necessary to rebuild the CEO’s 
option portfolio. I follow Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) approach and divide 
the CEO option into 3 parts: “Option granted in the current year”, “Unexercisable option 
granted in previous years” and “Exercisable option granted in the previous years” and 
calculate the option delta of the 3 types of option respectively. Since ExecuComp only 
provides the data of the option exercise price and remaining time to maturity for the 
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Option granted in the current year, it is necessary to estimate the option exercise price 
and remaining time to maturity for the “Unexercisable option granted in previous years” 
and “Exercisable option granted in the previous years”. 
For the option exercise price, I follow Core and Guay (2002) and use the realize value 
(the value of immediate exercising the option) divided by the number of option to 
estimate the option exercise price.  For the remaining time to maturity, I follow 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010), assumes that the maturity of “Unexercisable option 
granted in previous years” is 1 year less than “Option granted in the current year”. For 
“Exercisable option granted in the previous years”, the maturity is assumed to be 3 
years less than “Unexercisable option granted in previous years”. For those year with no 
new option granted, the maturity is assumed to be 9 years for “Unexercisable option 
granted in previous years” and 6 years for “Exercisable option granted in the previous 
years”. As the “Number of option granted in current year” is included in the “Number of 
unexercisable option” and “Number of exercisable option” in the ExecuComp database, 
in order to calculate the “Number of unexercisable option granted in previous years” 
and “Exercisable option granted in previous years”, it is necessary to deduct the 
“Number of option granted in current year” from the “Number of unexercisable option” 
and “Number of exercisable option”(as newly granted option are assumed to be 
unexercisable). If the “Number of option granted in current year” is larger than the 
“Number of unexercisable option”, the residual would be deducted from the “Number 
of exercisable option” in order to calculate the “Number of exercisable option granted 
in previous years”. 
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The computation of Delta in STATA  
 
Delta for New granted Option: 
gen new_z = (ln(prccf/expric) + exdate*(risk_free - bs_yield + bs_volatility/2))/ 
(bs_volatility* exdate^0.5) 
gen normal_z = N(new_z) 
gen new_delta = exp(-bs_yield *exdate)* normal_Z 
 
Delta for Unexericsable previous granted option: 
gen unex_mat = exdate – 1 
gen unex_expric = (opt_unex_unexer_est_val -  (prccf - expric)*(option_awards_num))/ 
opt_unex_unexer_num 
gen unex_z = (ln(prccf/unex_expric) + unex_mat*(risk_free - bs_yield + bs_volatility/2))/ 
(bs_volatility* unex_mat^0.5) 
gen normal_unex_z = N(unex_z) 
gen unex_delta = exp(-bs_yield *unex_mat)* normal_unex_z 
 
Delta for Exericsable previous granted option: 
gen ex_mat = exdate – 4 
for (prccf - expric)*(option_awards_num) > opt_unex_unexer_est_val: 
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gen ex_expric = (opt_unex_exer_est_val -  ((prccf - expric)*(option_awards_num) - 
opt_unex_unexer_est_val ))/ opt_unex_exer_num - prccf 
for (prccf - expric)*(option_awards_num) < opt_unex_unexer_est_val: 
gen ex_expric = (opt_unex_exer_est_val -  opt_unex_unexer_est_val)/ 
opt_unex_exer_num – prccf 
gen ex_z = (ln(prccf/ex_expric) + ex_mat*(risk_free - bs_yield + bs_volatility/2))/ 
(bs_volatility* ex_mat^0.5) 
gen normal_ex_z = N(ex_z) 
gen ex_delta = exp(-bs_yield *ex_mat)* normal_ex_z 
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Table A (Definition of variables) 
Variable name Variable definitions 
(name in CompuStat) 
  
Firm characteristics  
Ln(Asset) Natural log of Total Asset 
= log(AT) 
Leverage (Long term debt + debt in current liabilities)/total assets  
= (DLTT + DLC)/AT 
Market to book ratio (Common Shares Outstanding* Share Price at close + Total Asset 
- Common Equity) / Total Asset 
= (CSHO* PRCC_F  + AT – CEQ) / TA 
Profitability EBITDA/Total Asset 
= EBITDA/TA 
Tangibility Property, Plant and Equipment  (Net) / Total Asset 
= PPENT/TA 
Control for S&P rating Dummy variables for S&P credit rating, with AAA=1, AA=2  
A=3, BBB=4, BB=5, B=6, CCC=7, CC or below=8 
Control for industry Dummy variables control for different industries 
  
CEO Equity Compensation  
Option Incentive ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus),  
(where ONEPCT_OPT = 0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of 
options hold by CEO) 
Stock Incentive ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus),  
 (where ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share Price*no. of shares hold by 
CEO) 
Option Ratio Black-Scholes value of the option grant/Total Compensation 
= option_awards_blk_value/tdc1 
Stock Ratio Value of Restricted stock granted/Total Compensation 
= rstkgrnt/tdc1 
Option holding/Cash pay Unexercisable option estimated value + Exercisable option 
estimated value 
= opt_unex_exer_est_val + opt_unex_unexer_est_val 
Stock holding/Cash pay Share owned exclude option * share price at close 
= shrown_excl_opts * prccf 
  
Loan characteristics  
Ln(Deal amount) Natural log of the loan deal amount (in millions)  
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Ln(Maturity) Natural log of the loan maturity (in months) 
Performance dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan contains performance 
pricing 
Control for loan purpose Dummy variables for loan purpose 
Control for loan type Dummy variables for loan type 
  
Control for Macro factors  
Credit Spread The difference between AAA corporate bond and BAA corporate 
bond yield 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Loan Characteristics. 
 
Variable  N mean Std. Dev.  p25 p50 p75 
       Loan Deal Characteristics 
      Deal amount (million) 1512 567 997 150 300 635 
Maturity (months) 1512 42.704 21.565 24 48 60 
Performance pricing {0,1} 1512 0.776 0.417 1 1 1 
Secured {0,1} 1512 0.35 0.477 0 0 1 
 
Covenant Characteristics 
      No. of financial covenants 1512 2.223 1.141 1 2 3 
Coverage ratio covenant 1512 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 
Debt to cash flow covenant 1512 0.519 0.5 0 1 1 
Debt to balance sheet covenant 1512 0.333 0.472 0 0 1 
Net worth covenant 1512 0.392 0.488 0 0 1 
Liquidity covenant 1512 0.089 0.285 0 0 0 
Minimum cash flow covenant 1512 0.054 0.227 0 0 0 
Capital expenditure restriction 1512 0.196 0.397 0 0 0 
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Table 2  
Summary Statistics of Firm, CEO’s compensation and Credit Spread. 
 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
       Firm characteristics 
      Asset size (million) 1512 4890 11700 660 1600 4100 
Leverage 1512 0.266 0.166 0.151 0.268 0.366 
Profitability 1512 -0.355 6.347 0.000 0.079 0.150 
Tangibility 1512 0.279 0.271 0.050 0.182 0.445 
Market-to-Book-Ratio 1512 1.870 1.670 1.196 1.497 2.065 
 
 
      CEO compensation (thousand) 
      Option Holdings 1512 13051.17 41400.41 330.228 2903.512 10529.88 
Stock Holdings 1458 68164.88 499654.5 1569.087 5634.107 19271.23 
Option award 1512 2270.571 5369.717 0.000 724.157 2036.648 
Stock award 1512 568.343 2003.030 0.000 0.000 216.113 
Salary 1512 696.694 341.757 450.319 650.000 878.814 
Bonus 1512 836.691 1636.405 150.000 469.000 976.957 
Total Compensation 1512 4847.493 7434.464 1341.275 2563.169 5184.623 
 
 
CEO Incentive measure 
      Option incentive 1511 0.124 0.125 0.040 0.089 0.167 
Stock Incentive 1512 0.122 0.199 0.013 0.039 0.127 
Option Ratio 1512 0.330 0.276 0.000 0.317 0.535 
Stock Ratio 1512 0.079 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.099 
Option holding/Cash Pay 1506 9.256997 65.16628 .3831589 2.47714 7.51783 
Stock holding/Cash Pay 1455 2886653 65200000 1.493629 4.31851 15.1043 
CEO delta (thousand) 1512 5211.222 937.024 90.42453 203.1887 561.017 
CEO vega (thousand) 1512 180.6963 47.22329 .0000641 .4112174 32.80749 
 
Other Control       
Credit Spread 1512 0.867 0.196 0.600 0.830 0.890 
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Table 3 
Incentive Ratio and Number of Financial Covenants. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional poisson regression. It 
examines the effects of CEO equity incentive ratio on the number of financial covenants contain 
in loan agreement. The sample contains 1512 private credit agreements from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR electronic filing system from1996 to 2006. The 
dependent variable is the number of financial covenants. The key variables are Option Incentive, 
which is defined as ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_OPT 
= 0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of options hold by CEO) and Stock Incentive, which is 
defined as ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_STK = 
0.01*Share Price*no. of shares hold by CEO. The *, ** and *** indicate the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in industry level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num 
      
Option Incentive 0.283** 0.257** 0.260** 0.153** 0.135** 
 (0.113) (0.101) (0.112) (0.0687) (0.0669) 
Stock Incentive 0.0651 0.0415 0.0459 0.0585 0.0219 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.153) (0.120) (0.128) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0218* 0.0258** 0.0228** 0.0219 0.0303* 
 (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.00929) (0.0174) (0.0163) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0703*** -0.0268 0.0679*** 0.0174 -0.0402 
 (0.0215) (0.0366) (0.0233) (0.0225) (0.0349) 
Performance dummy 0.0171 0.0401* 0.0176 0.0419** 0.0448** 
 (0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0220) (0.0206) (0.0215) 
Profitability -0.000694 -0.00129* -0.000787 -0.00141 -0.00160 
 (0.00123) (0.000770) (0.00131) (0.00120) (0.000991) 
Tangibility 0.0392 0.0265 0.0544 0.0118 0.0217 
 (0.0385) (0.0348) (0.0349) (0.0416) (0.0390) 
Ln(Asset) -0.187*** -0.156*** -0.181*** -0.132*** -0.120*** 
 (0.00916) (0.00854) (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.00905) 
Leverage 0.0421 -0.00209 0.0618 -0.119 -0.130 
 (0.109) (0.0952) (0.120) (0.0965) (0.0907) 
Market to book ratio -0.0502 -0.0441 -0.0493 -0.0229 -0.0223 
 (0.0509) (0.0423) (0.0499) (0.0236) (0.0206) 
Spread difference 0.128 0.219*** 0.120 0.0926 0.160** 
 (0.0817) (0.0711) (0.0769) (0.0806) (0.0733) 
Loan purpose No Yes No No Yes 
      
Loan type No Yes No No Yes 
      
Industry No No Yes No Yes 
      
S&P rating No No No Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0376 0.0448 0.0392 0.0570 0.0612 
      
Observations 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 
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Table 4 
Incentive Ratio and Coverage Covenant. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional probit regression. It 
examines the effects of CEO equity incentive ratio on the probability of having the coverage 
covenant in loan agreement. The sample contains 1512 private credit agreements from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR electronic filing system from1996 to 
2006. The dependent variable is the number of financial covenants. The key variables are Option 
Incentive, which is defined as ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus), where 
ONEPCT_OPT = 0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of options hold by CEO) and Stock 
Incentive, which is defined as ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus), where 
ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share Price*no. of shares hold by CEO. The *, ** and *** indicate the 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in industry 
level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES d_cover d_cover d_cover d_cover d_cover 
      
Option Incentive 0.410*** 0.403*** 0.379*** 0.315*** 0.282** 
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.128) (0.106) (0.116) 
Stock Incentive -0.0409 -0.0299 -0.0637 -0.0516 -0.0586 
 (0.119) (0.127) (0.129) (0.123) (0.139) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0689*** 0.0668*** 0.0704*** 0.0684*** 0.0689*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0186) (0.0222) (0.0211) (0.0204) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0797*** 0.0859* 0.0834*** 0.0529** 0.0853** 
 (0.0225) (0.0445) (0.0228) (0.0265) (0.0414) 
Performance dummy 0.0372 0.0458 0.0293 0.0433 0.0349 
 (0.0314) (0.0395) (0.0307) (0.0280) (0.0338) 
Profitability -0.00405 -0.00412 -0.00466 -0.00797 -0.00940 
 (0.00592) (0.00445) (0.00670) (0.00773) (0.00707) 
Tangibility -0.0111 -0.00825 0.00888 -0.0283 0.00318 
 (0.0662) (0.0687) (0.0587) (0.0720) (0.0698) 
Ln(Asset) -0.146*** -0.139*** -0.144*** -0.116*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0248) (0.0229) (0.0255) 
Leverage 0.0414 0.0481 0.104** -0.0616 -0.00169 
 (0.0478) (0.0534) (0.0415) (0.0712) (0.0543) 
Market to book ratio -0.0461** -0.0436** -0.0480** -0.0180 -0.0188 
 (0.0222) (0.0202) (0.0195) (0.0119) (0.0120) 
Spread difference 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.201*** 0.202*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0490) (0.0338) (0.0482) (0.0465) 
Loan purpose No Yes No No Yes 
      
Loan type No Yes No No Yes 
      
Industry No No Yes No Yes 
      
S&P rating No No No Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0923 0.1017 0.1134 0.1358 0.1641 
      
Observations 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 
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Table 5  
Incentive Ratio and Debt to Cash Flow Covenant. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional probit regression. It 
examines the effects of CEO equity incentive ratio on the probability of having the debt to cash 
flow covenant in loan agreement. The sample contains 1512 private credit agreements from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR electronic filing system from1996 to 
2006. The dependent variable is the number of financial covenants. The key variables are Option 
Incentive, which is defined as ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus), where 
ONEPCT_OPT = 0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of options hold by CEO) and Stock 
Incentive, which is defined as ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus), where 
ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share Price*no. of shares hold by CEO. The *, ** and *** indicate the 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in industry 
level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES d_dcf d_dcf d_dcf d_dcf d_dcf 
      
Option Incentive 0.506*** 0.490*** 0.418*** 0.438** 0.339** 
 (0.121) (0.163) (0.0805) (0.178) (0.137) 
Stock Incentive -0.0717* -0.0392 -0.119 -0.0954*** -0.0950*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0303) (0.0723) (0.0333) (0.0365) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.132*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0168) (0.0135) (0.0155) (0.0149) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0692*** 0.00117 0.0805*** 0.0264* -0.00684 
 (0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0169) (0.0150) (0.0189) 
Performance dummy 0.0335 0.0537 0.0291 0.0602 0.0608 
 (0.0462) (0.0409) (0.0520) (0.0403) (0.0384) 
Profitability 0.000212 -0.000676 0.000354 -0.000732 -0.00118 
 (0.00186) (0.00194) (0.00190) (0.00170) (0.00201) 
Tangibility 0.0627 0.0568 0.0559 0.0295 0.0206 
 (0.0665) (0.0642) (0.0791) (0.0787) (0.0874) 
Ln(Asset) -0.180*** -0.154*** -0.180*** -0.132*** -0.124*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0315) (0.0378) (0.0304) (0.0414) 
Leverage -0.0986 -0.0916 -0.00861 -0.195* -0.0978 
 (0.103) (0.130) (0.0731) (0.116) (0.117) 
Market to book ratio -0.0211 -0.0163 -0.0250 -0.00306 -0.00505 
 (0.0214) (0.0121) (0.0211) (0.00858) (0.00710) 
Spread difference 0.341*** 0.319*** 0.322*** 0.329*** 0.251*** 
 (0.0819) (0.0929) (0.0735) (0.0821) (0.0857) 
Loan purpose No Yes No No Yes 
      
Loan type No Yes No No Yes 
      
Industry No No Yes No Yes 
      
S&P rating No No No Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.1016 0.1327 0.1353 0.1642 0.2144 
      
Observations 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 1,511 
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Table 6  
Annual Compensation Ratio and Number of Covenants. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional poisson regression. It 
examines the effects of CEO equity incentive ratio on the number of financial covenants contain 
in loan agreement. The sample contains 1512 private credit agreements from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR electronic filing system from1996 to 2006. The 
dependent variable is the number of financial covenants. The key variables are Option Ratio (the 
percentage of current year total compensation in grants of new options) and Stock Ratio (the 
percentage of current year total compensation in grants of new stock). The *, ** and *** indicate 
the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in 
industry level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num 
      
Option Ratio 0.0954*** 0.0919*** 0.0933** 0.0813*** 0.0709*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0312) (0.0380) (0.0246) (0.0234) 
Stock Ratio -0.274*** -0.269*** -0.277*** -0.259** -0.256** 
 (0.0975) (0.0847) (0.0966) (0.117) (0.108) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0242* 0.0303** 0.0260*** 0.0237 0.0344** 
 (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.00981) (0.0163) (0.0142) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0749*** -0.0271 0.0716*** 0.0205 -0.0412 
 (0.0223) (0.0392) (0.0244) (0.0238) (0.0370) 
Performance dummy 0.0202 0.0444** 0.0217 0.0443** 0.0486** 
 (0.0218) (0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0193) (0.0203) 
Profitability -0.000915 -0.00152** -0.00102 -0.00157 -0.00179* 
 (0.00121) (0.000742) (0.00128) (0.00120) (0.000996) 
Tangibility 0.0356 0.0231 0.0505 0.00777 0.0181 
 (0.0384) (0.0345) (0.0339) (0.0413) (0.0380) 
Ln(Asset) -0.178*** -0.149*** -0.174*** -0.125*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0108) (0.00987) (0.0132) (0.0114) (0.00973) 
Leverage 0.0370 -0.00222 0.0584 -0.119 -0.128 
 (0.100) (0.0885) (0.115) (0.0853) (0.0840) 
Market to book ratio -0.0427 -0.0380 -0.0432 -0.0204 -0.0207 
 (0.0452) (0.0379) (0.0441) (0.0226) (0.0198) 
Spread difference 0.129 0.212*** 0.122 0.0896 0.152** 
 (0.0800) (0.0652) (0.0764) (0.0807) (0.0718) 
Loan purpose No Yes No No Yes 
      
Loan type No Yes No No Yes 
      
Industry No No Yes No Yes 
      
S&P rating No No No Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0385 0.0459 0.0403 0.0582 0.0623 
      
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
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Table 7 
Equity Holdings and Number of Covenants. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional poisson regression. It 
examines the effects of CEO equity incentive ratio on the number of financial covenants contain 
in loan agreement. The sample contains 1512 private credit agreements from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR electronic filing system from1996 to 2006. The 
dependent variable is the number of financial covenants. The key variables are Option 
holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated option holdings to the current year cash pay of CEO) 
and Stock holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated stock holdings to the current year cash pay 
of CEO). The *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust 
standard errors are clustered in industry level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num 
      
Option holding/Cash pay 0.00239*** 0.00214*** 0.00239*** 0.00149*** 0.00139*** 
 (0.000340) (0.000249) (0.000291) (0.000145) (0.000131) 
Stock holding/Cash pay -7.10e-10*** -7.23e-10*** -6.78e-10*** -7.36e-10*** -7.23e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0429*** 0.0466*** 0.0437*** 0.0361** 0.0446*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0154) (0.0121) (0.0182) (0.0169) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0587*** -0.0464 0.0566** 0.00906 -0.0546* 
 (0.0217) (0.0330) (0.0229) (0.0214) (0.0330) 
Performance dummy 0.126* 0.208*** 0.116* 0.0879 0.153** 
 (0.0753) (0.0644) (0.0697) (0.0766) (0.0669) 
Profitability 0.0276 0.0491** 0.0279 0.0502** 0.0517** 
 (0.0253) (0.0228) (0.0249) (0.0205) (0.0205) 
Tangibility -0.000692 -0.00124* -0.000771 -0.00138 -0.00155 
 (0.00115) (0.000680) (0.00122) (0.00113) (0.000950) 
Ln(Asset) 0.0486 0.0432 0.0650* 0.0221 0.0381 
 (0.0380) (0.0352) (0.0347) (0.0402) (0.0390) 
Leverage -0.204*** -0.172*** -0.198*** -0.145*** -0.135*** 
 (0.00745) (0.0120) (0.00686) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
Market to book ratio -0.0405 -0.0879 -0.0159 -0.182** -0.196** 
 (0.0817) (0.0742) (0.103) (0.0789) (0.0839) 
Spread difference -0.111*** -0.102*** -0.112*** -0.0678*** -0.0668*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0123) (0.0148) (0.00780) (0.00750) 
Loan purpose No Yes No No Yes 
      
Loan type No Yes No No Yes 
      
Industry No No Yes No Yes 
      
S&P rating No No No Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0418 0.0490 0.0435 0.0595 0.0638 
      
Observations 1,455 1,455 1,455 1,455 1,455 
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Table 8 
CEO delta, CEO vega and Number of Covenants. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional poisson regression. It 
examines the effects of CEO equity incentive ratio on the number of financial covenants contain 
in loan agreement. The dependent variable is the number of financial covenants. The key 
variables are CEO delta (the dollar change in the value of the option and stock holdings for a 1 % 
change in the stock price) and CEO vega (the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s option 
holdings for a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns). The *, ** and *** indicate 
the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in 
industry level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES fin_num7 fin_num7 fin_num7 fin_num7 fin_num7 
      
CEO delta -1.25e-05 -1.27e-05 -1.45e-05 -7.35e-06 -9.67e-06 
 (1.23e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.32e-05) (1.07e-05) (1.06e-05) 
CEO vega 0.000389*** 0.000355*** 0.000345*** 0.000170** 0.000148** 
 (7.98e-05) (5.79e-05) (0.000103) (6.74e-05) (7.27e-05) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0222 0.0252* 0.0241* 0.0227 0.0305** 
 (0.0148) (0.0132) (0.0124) (0.0176) (0.0146) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.0748*** -0.0235 0.0724*** 0.0232 -0.0366 
 (0.0240) (0.0380) (0.0259) (0.0251) (0.0366) 
Performance dummy 0.0128 0.0359* 0.0136 0.0365* 0.0399* 
 (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0193) (0.0208) 
Profitability -0.000753 -0.00126* -0.000865 -0.00143 -0.00158 
 (0.00122) (0.000754) (0.00130) (0.00120) (0.000987) 
Tangibility 0.0355 0.0228 0.0521 0.00999 0.0204 
 (0.0358) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0390) (0.0359) 
Ln(Asset) -0.176*** -0.145*** -0.171*** -0.125*** -0.113*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0117) (0.0186) (0.00946) (0.00884) 
Leverage 0.0350 -0.00993 0.0493 -0.117 -0.135* 
 (0.0957) (0.0858) (0.107) (0.0816) (0.0797) 
Market to book ratio -0.0357 -0.0313 -0.0348 -0.0149 -0.0148 
 (0.0485) (0.0405) (0.0474) (0.0234) (0.0207) 
Spread difference 0.126 0.225*** 0.119 0.0935 0.169** 
 (0.0814) (0.0688) (0.0771) (0.0798) (0.0716) 
Loan purpose No Yes No No Yes 
      
Loan type No Yes No No Yes 
      
Industry No No Yes No Yes 
      
S&P rating No No No Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0369 0.0441 0.0385 0.0552 0.0596 
      
Observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506 
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Table 9 
Subsample Analysis: Credit Spread. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional probit regression. It 
examines the results of subsample analysis of the impact of equity compensation on number of 
financial covenants contain in loan agreement. The key variables are Option Incentive, which is 
defined as ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_OPT = 
0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of options hold by CEO), Stock Incentive, which is defined as 
ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share 
Price*no. of shares hold by CEO, Option Ratio (the percentage of current year total compensation 
in grants of new options), Stock Ratio (the percentage of current year total compensation in grants 
of new stock), Option holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated option holdings to the current 
year cash pay of CEO) and Stock holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated stock holdings to 
the current year cash pay of CEO). The subsample of high credit spread includes observations 
with credit spread above median and the subsample of low credit spread includes observations 
with credit spread below median. The *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in industry level. 
 
 
Credit Spread Credit Spread  Credit Spread  
 (High) (Low) (High) (Low) (High) (Low) 
VARIABLES FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num 
       
Option Incentive 0.229** 0.105     
 (0.108) (0.0804)     
Stock Incentive -0.0757 0.117     
 (0.135) (0.104)     
Option Ratio   0.1000*** 0.0221   
   (0.0244) (0.0434)   
Stock Ratio   -0.139** -0.415*   
   (0.0671) (0.213)   
Option holding/Cash pay     0.00247** 0.000829*** 
     (0.00119) (0.000318) 
Stock holding/Cash pay     -1.05e-09*** -3.53e-10*** 
     (0) (0) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0751*** -0.0224 0.0778*** -0.0173 0.0709*** -0.00799 
 (0.0184) (0.0319) (0.0191) (0.0286) (0.0162) (0.0327) 
Ln(Maturity) -0.0847** 0.0626 -0.0859** 0.0579 -0.0887** 0.0405 
 (0.0367) (0.0502) (0.0361) (0.0514) (0.0362) (0.0543) 
Performance dummy 0.0181 0.0505 0.0236 0.0550 0.0194 0.0557 
 (0.0206) (0.0497) (0.0224) (0.0483) (0.0212) (0.0486) 
Profitability -0.00434* -0.00149* -0.00386 -0.00175* -0.00441 -0.00132* 
 (0.00251) (0.000859) (0.00304) (0.000935) (0.00274) (0.000776) 
Tangibility 0.0224 -0.0398 0.0216 -0.0460* 0.0250 -0.0194 
 (0.0712) (0.0260) (0.0755) (0.0257) (0.0731) (0.0274) 
Ln(Asset) -0.147*** -0.101*** -0.146*** -0.0946*** -0.147*** -0.107*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0228) (0.0137) (0.0224) (0.0144) (0.0273) 
Leverage -0.0810 -0.286*** -0.0880 -0.287*** -0.0911 -0.368*** 
 (0.134) (0.0352) (0.141) (0.0375) (0.141) (0.0579) 
Market to book ratio -0.0780*** -0.00986 -0.0760*** -0.00585 -0.0852*** -0.0411** 
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 (0.00618) (0.00683) (0.00557) (0.00427) (0.00846) (0.0169) 
Spread difference 0.352*** 0.196 0.329*** 0.265 0.344*** 0.245 
 (0.112) (0.304) (0.109) (0.332) (0.111) (0.310) 
Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
S&P rating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0581 0.0818 0.0584 0.0830 0.0602 0.0822 
       
Observations 918 593 919 593 891 564 
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Table 10 
Subsample Analysis: leverage. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional probit regression. It 
examines the results of subsample analysis of the impact of equity compensation on number of 
financial covenants contain in loan agreement. The subsample of high leverage includes 
observations with credit spread above median and the subsample of low leverage includes 
observations with credit spread below median. The key variables are Option Incentive, which is 
defined as ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_OPT = 
0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of options hold by CEO), Stock Incentive, which is defined as 
ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share 
Price*no. of shares hold by CEO, Option Ratio (the percentage of current year total compensation 
in grants of new options), Stock Ratio (the percentage of current year total compensation in grants 
of new stock), Option holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated option holdings to the current 
year cash pay of CEO) and Stock holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated stock holdings to 
the current year cash pay of CEO). The subsample of high credit spread includes observations 
with credit spread above median and the subsample of low credit spread includes observations 
with credit spread below median. The *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in industry level. 
 Leverage Leverage  Leverage  
 (High) (Low) (High) (Low) (High) (Low) 
VARIABLES FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num 
       
Option Incentive 0.0777 0.317***     
 (0.161) (0.0668)     
Stock Incentive 0.0364 0.0336     
 (0.138) (0.119)     
Option Ratio   0.0492 0.119***   
   (0.0345) (0.0348)   
Stock Ratio   -0.382** -0.162   
   (0.150) (0.118)   
Option holding/Cash pay     0.00366*** 0.00123*** 
     (0.00122) (0.000175) 
Stock holding/Cash pay     -7.05e-10*** -5.62e-05 
     (0) (0.000128) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0428** 0.00212 0.0457*** 0.00895 0.0469*** 0.0248 
 (0.0192) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0163) (0.0172) 
Ln(Maturity) 0.00223 -0.0728* -0.000149 -0.0700 -0.00508 -0.0825** 
 (0.0430) (0.0375) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0435) (0.0358) 
Performance dummy -0.0130 0.112*** -0.00982 0.113*** -0.00175 0.112*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0267) (0.0302) (0.0284) (0.0320) (0.0280) 
Profitability -0.000344* -0.00574 -0.000753*** -0.00559 -0.000414** -0.00532 
 (0.000180) (0.00404) (0.000153) (0.00452) (0.000180) (0.00378) 
Tangibility -0.0427 0.0696 -0.0474 0.0701 -0.0355 0.0934 
 (0.0778) (0.0734) (0.0709) (0.0836) (0.0769) (0.0748) 
Ln(Asset) -0.0996*** -0.137*** -0.0947*** -0.132*** -0.110*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0185) (0.0246) (0.0221) (0.0283) (0.0178) 
Leverage -0.119 0.177 -0.118 0.202 -0.106 -0.0452 
 (0.125) (0.325) (0.122) (0.328) (0.119) (0.354) 
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Market to book ratio -0.0632*** -0.0176 -0.0610** -0.0117 -0.0902*** -0.0556*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0144) (0.0242) (0.0129) (0.0248) (0.00793) 
Spread difference 0.233*** 0.0912 0.227** 0.0896 0.231*** 0.0792 
 (0.0871) (0.0732) (0.0956) (0.0706) (0.0837) (0.0736) 
 loan purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 S&P rating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0582 0.0738 0.0603 0.0741 0.0599 0.0758 
       
Observations 756 755 756 756 732 723 
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Table 11 
Subsample Analysis: Market to book ratio. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional probit regression. It 
examines the results of subsample analysis of the impact of equity compensation on number of 
financial covenants contain in loan agreement. The key variables are Option Incentive, which is 
defined as ONEPCT_OPT / (ONEPCT_OPT + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_OPT = 
0.01*Share Price*option delta*no. of options hold by CEO), Stock Incentive, which is defined as 
ONEPCT_STK / (ONEPCT_STK + Salary + Bonus), where ONEPCT_STK = 0.01*Share 
Price*no. of shares hold by CEO, Option Ratio (the percentage of current year total compensation 
in grants of new options), Stock Ratio (the percentage of current year total compensation in grants 
of new stock), Option holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated option holdings to the current 
year cash pay of CEO) and Stock holding/Cash pay (the ratio of accumulated stock holdings to 
the current year cash pay of CEO). The subsample of high market to book ratio includes 
observations with market to book ratio above median and the subsample of low market to book 
ratio includes observations with market to book ratio below median. The *, ** and *** indicate 
the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are clustered in 
industry level. 
 
 Market to book ratio Market to book ratio Market to book ratio 
 (High) (Low) (High) (Low) (High) (Low) 
VARIABLES FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num FinCov_Num 
       
Option Incentive 0.367*** -0.0410     
 (0.0858) (0.200)     
Stock Incentive 0.0431 0.0418     
 (0.164) (0.0990)     
Option Ratio   0.150*** -0.00848   
   (0.0242) (0.0578)   
Stock Ratio   -0.249*** -0.274**   
   (0.0844) (0.132)   
Option holding/Cash pay     0.000973*** -0.00123 
     (0.000319) (0.00247) 
Stock holding/Cash pay     -6.54e-05 -3.27e-10*** 
     (0.000142) (0) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0190 0.0384*** 0.0228 0.0426*** 0.0333 0.0435*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0127) (0.0287) (0.0117) (0.0330) (0.0140) 
Ln(Maturity) -0.0411 -0.0203 -0.0485 -0.0160 -0.0525 -0.0377 
 (0.0559) (0.0537) (0.0602) (0.0527) (0.0522) (0.0620) 
Performance dummy 0.0629** 0.0223 0.0652*** 0.0246 0.0643** 0.0354 
 (0.0289) (0.0367) (0.0222) (0.0376) (0.0264) (0.0431) 
Profitability 0.00273 -0.00107 0.00341 -0.00125 0.00170 -0.00110 
 (0.00223) (0.00106) (0.00307) (0.00100) (0.00266) (0.00104) 
Tangibility 0.0548 -0.00985 0.0526 -0.0114 0.0611 0.0109 
 (0.0459) (0.0535) (0.0520) (0.0470) (0.0491) (0.0583) 
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Ln(Asset) -0.140*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.132*** -0.127*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0146) (0.0115) (0.0137) (0.0189) (0.0125) 
Leverage -0.238 -0.165*** -0.232* -0.174*** -0.295* -0.162*** 
 (0.150) (0.0478) (0.138) (0.0461) (0.161) (0.0467) 
Market to book ratio -0.0159* -0.116 -0.00967 -0.109 -0.0417*** -0.122 
 (0.00922) (0.114) (0.00765) (0.116) (0.0110) (0.120) 
Spread difference -0.0304 0.188* -0.0261 0.189* 0.0220 0.169 
 (0.0628) (0.101) (0.0644) (0.104) (0.0589) (0.105) 
Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
S&P rating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0741 0.0608 0.0749 0.0620 0.0767 0.0611 
       
Observations 755 756 756 756 733 725 
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Table 12 
Robustness Test: Instrumental Variables. 
This table presents the coefficient from the unbalanced cross sectional OLS regression with the 
Instrumental Variables. It examines the effects of CEO equity incentive ratio on the number of 
financial covenants contain in loan agreement. Instrumental Variables for Option Incentive ratio 
is the average option holding of other firms in the same industry; Instrumental Variables for 
Stock Incentive ratio is the average stock holding of other firms in the same industry; 
Instrumental Variables for Option ratio is the average Option  ratio of other firms in the same 
industry; Instrumental Variables for Stock ratio is the average stock ratio of other firms in the 
same industry; Instrumental Variables for Option Holding / Cash Pay is the average Option 
Holding / Cash Pay of other firms in the same industry; Instrumental Variables for Stock Holding 
/ Cash Pay is the average Stock Holding / Cash Pay of other firms in the same industry. The *, ** 
and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are 
clustered in industry level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES fin_num7 fin_num7 fin_num7 
    
Option Incentive 1.446**   
 (0.627)   
Stock Incentive -0.630   
 (0.438)   
Option Ratio  0.309**  
  (0.123)  
Stock Ratio  -0.465  
  (0.310)  
Option holding/Cash pay   0.00272*** 
   (0.000215) 
Stock holding/Cash pay   -6.79e-10*** 
   (0) 
Ln(Deal amount) 0.0650*** 0.0665** 0.0876** 
 (0.0227) (0.0280) (0.0354) 
Ln(Maturity) -0.133* -0.0947 -0.126 
 (0.0741) (0.0796) (0.0797) 
Performance dummy 0.358*** 0.324** 0.346* 
 (0.136) (0.140) (0.143) 
Profitability 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.105** 
 (0.0295) (0.0370) (0.0427) 
Tangibility -0.00331 -0.00385 -0.00330 
 (0.00250) (0.00265) (0.00282) 
Ln(Asset) 0.0843 0.0378 0.0835 
 (0.0728) (0.0763) (0.0833) 
Leverage -0.277*** -0.251*** -0.278*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0123) (0.0256) 
Market to book ratio -0.308* -0.298* -0.436* 
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 (0.171) (0.164) (0.183) 
Spread difference -0.0649** -0.0469 -0.132*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0316) (0.0124) 
Loan purpose 0.121 0.139 -0.596 
 (0.0786) (0.0918) (0.555) 
Loan type 0.477 0.185 0.358 
 (0.439) (0.329) (0.528) 
Industry -0.203*** -0.183*** 0.0930 
 (0.0474) (0.0460) (0) 
S&P rating -0.0428 -0.00233 0.575 
 (0.129) (0.127) (0.329) 
Observations 1,457 1,512 1,455 
    
R-squared 0.287 0.313 0.316 
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